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AMERICAN INDIANS CRIME AND THE LAW:

Five Years of Scholarship on Criminal
Justice in Indian Country
t
Kevin K. Washburn

It is a tremendous honor to serve as the inaugural William C. Canby, Jr.,
Scholar in Residence. I must begin by talking about the man that this post
was created to honor. Judge Canby was a law professor on the Arizona
State faculty when, in 1980, he was appointed by President Jimmy Carter to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Among other academic
works, he is the author of American Indian Law in a Nutshell, now in its
fourth edition.
Many of Judge Canby's former clerks will tell you that the year they
spent working for him was the best year of their careers. Over the years,
many of us have threatened to chain ourselves to our desks and refuse to
leave. Indeed, although clerks usually leave around Labor Day, I managed
to stretch my term until almost October of 1994 before I finally left for the
Honors Program at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.
To be sure, clerking for any judge is a great job for a young lawyer. I
have often thought it a little ironic that the most important work that many
lawyers will ever perform occurs in their first year after graduating from
law school. But while the job itself is an important one and can be very
rewarding, one of the most valuable things many clerks take from the job is
a role model, an example of the professional behavior we ought to model in
our own careers. Thus, the identity of the judge is crucial to a clerk's
development as a lawyer and I was particularly fortunate to clerk for Judge
Canby.
Because of the weight of the responsibility and the solitary nature of the
work, it is hard to be a judge, and I suspect that the weight increases as the
level of the court increases. Judges make difficult decisions every day, and
many of them take that to heart, recognizing the importance of this work. In
t
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an effort to show respect and perhaps in an effort to gain favor, many
lawyers stop treating judges as fellow human beings and begin to treat them
in a much more deferential manner. Judges often begin to internalize the
importance of their work and their decisions, and grow accustomed to such
deference. When this effect grows pronounced, members of the bar
sometimes call it "black-robe-itis."
Despite the power of these natural tendencies, Judge Canby was immune
to them. In my practice, I have had the good fortune to meet a lot of federal
judges and I believe that Judge Canby has worn his black robe lighter than
any judge that I have ever encountered. And though Judge Canby never
shirked the responsibility of being a federal circuit judge-and I know that
he felt the weight of that tremendous responsibility, particularly in death
penalty cases-he somehow avoided the sense of self-importance that often
comes naturally with such an influential position and significant work. He is
the rarest of judges, one who never lost his status as human being when he
donned the black robes.
Does Judge Canby have faults? Well, yes, of course. His legendary sense
of humor is as arid as the Arizona desert and it is sometimes far too subtle, a
problem compounded by the fact that he never delivers a punch line with
much of a sense of moment. Indeed, his humor sneaks up on you. It is
sometimes so unexpected that one does not realize the judge is joking until
several beats have passed.
The year I spent working with Judge Canby was an absolute joy. And for
me, the experience lasted well beyond that year. Of all the former clerks for
Judge Canby-and by now there must be seventy-five or more-none of
them benefited more from the association with Judge Canby than I did.
Because of his reputation in the field of Indian law, a clerkship with Judge
Canby is the golden ticket for a career in the field of Indian law. Because of
this background, I was given choice assignments at the Department of
Justice. When I began to teach, I started at the University of Minnesota, a
top-ranked law school that happened to be the Judge's alma mater. By now,
my curriculum vita has a lot of lines, including federal prosecutor, general
counsel of a federal agency, and a visiting chaired professor at Harvard.
Nevertheless, within my field, the line that draws the most interest is the
one that draws the inevitable comment: "Wow, you clerked for Judge
Canby?!" It is remarkable that American Indian law is little more than an
avocation for Judge Canby. He has, of course, a full time "day job" that
keeps him rather busy. Yet he is far more well known in the Indian law
field, even within academia, than many of the scholars who make it their
life's principal work. This is truly a credit to Judge Canby's wisdom and
influence as a scholar, as well as a judge.
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Much of my own Indian law scholarship has been at the nexus of
criminal procedure. Judge Canby set me on the path of criminal procedure,
and it was an unlikely path for me. I am probably violating the rules of
"judicial clerkship confidentiality" to tell this story, but I have long carried
with me an experience I had as Judge Canby's clerk. When I began, I was a
novice. The principal scholar on criminal procedure at Yale Law School
seemed to have stopped paying attention to the field about the time the
Warren Court started, so he had not focused much on the revolutionary
changes that brought about most of the field of modern criminal procedure.
And thus, I didn't know very much about the field when I started clerking
for Judge Canby. (Moreover, Indian law had not been offered at Yale
during my time there, so I was unprepared in many areas of law.)
One of the cases Judge Canby assigned me was a fairly straightforward
Fourth Amendment case dealing with the public safety exception to the
Miranda rule.' The case involved a police officer who was about to search a
suspect, in custody at the police station, incident to booking the suspect into
jail, and the officer said, in essence, "Am I going to find any drugs or
needles in your pockets?" The officer testified that he routinely asked that
sort of question to protect himself from reaching into a pocket and getting
poked by a needle. The suspect answered the question by volunteering a
little more information than the question called for. "No," he said, "I don't
use drugs, I sell them."
The legal question arose because the facts indicated the suspect had not
yet received a Miranda warning. The prosecution had used the suspect's
statement in the ensuing narcotics prosecution. The district court had
admitted the statement. The question was whether the suspect's statement
was properly admitted under the public safety exception to the Miranda
rule.
The leading case in the area,2 which I found in my research since I had
not learned it in law school, involved a suspect who had been arrested in a
grocery store. Since the suspect had entered the store armed and did not
have the gun in his possession when he was arrested, the police were
desperate to find the gun to prevent a customer or a child from finding it.
The police did not read the suspect a Miranda warning before demanding to
know where the suspect had ditched the gun. And the suspect directed them
to the gun. All's well that ends well-the police officers retrieved the gun.
But the gun was a key piece of evidence that the prosecution later
1.
2.

United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1994).
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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introduced at trial. The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the gun
and that created the so-called public safety exception to the Miranda rule.
As with any good case, the Supreme Court decision did not entirely
answer the question in the case before the Ninth Circuit. The panel could
either follow the case or distinguish it. Since the officer in this case had
merely asked a "yes or no" question and did not seem to be doing it for
purposes of investigation, I wrote up a draft opinion concluding that the
statement was admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda. I
then sent it up to the judge and, not long thereafter, Judge Canby filed an
opinion in the case in which there was no dissent. I didn't think about it
much again until a few months later when the opinion had been published,
and another judge, not on the panel, called for en banc review of the case.
The memo, written by one judge, was quickly joined by a couple of other
judges. Suddenly, there was a small movement to get the case reheard en
banc.
As the law clerk who had worked on the opinion, I was mortified by
such scrutiny. And the memo that these other judges had written was very
compelling. As I recall, it focused on the issue of expediency. The argument
in the judge's memo-which was far better, by the way, than the defense
counsel's brief-was basically that there was no need for expeditious action
that would justify the failure to read a Miranda warning before the search.
Since the defendant was in custody, it would not cause any harm to wait
another few seconds before conducting the search. In sum, the other judge's
memo explained that the officer should have stopped, read the Miranda
warning, and then proceeded. No harm would come from waiting a few
moments. And that simple fact effectively distinguished the grocery store
case. I was mortified. In the draft opinion, I had focused almost entirely on
the need for the information and the danger posed by the circumstances. In
the case before the court, the need for the information-safety-was very
similar and the Miranda warning might simply cause the defendant to avoid
answering the question honestly and directly. But I found the judge's memo
fairly compelling.
Judging is not primarily a political activity, but on criminal procedure
issues Judge Canby is usually on the left. He was appointed by a Democrat
to the court, and he has a healthy respect for the Constitution as a restraint
on police power and as a protection of ordinary citizens and suspects. And
in a close case, he is probably more inclined to preserve the constitutional
liberties at issue and rule for the defendant.
To make matters worse, the call for en banc review was from other
Democratic appointees. We clerks, like some judges, have an inflated sense
of our self-importance while we're clerking. I thought, "Oh my God, what
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did I do?!" I had never even spoken to Judge Canby about this case. I had
just sent the draft opinion forward. And I had ignored what was really a key
facet of the case that I should have seen and discussed more clearly. And I
believed that, by failing to flag the issue, I had inadvertently transformed
Judge Canby into some sort of right-wing, pro-law enforcement nut job.
I was feeling awful about the case and I felt that I had placed Judge
Canby on the wrong side of the court by missing or ignoring this key issue
in the case. But, in the midst of my agony, I actually found the slip opinion
that Judge Canby had authored, and I read it closely. As I read, my heart
began to sink even more. It seemed to follow the draft that I had given him.
The statement of facts section was the same, as were the presentation of the
issue and the first few paragraphs in the analysis section. A few of the
sentences showed some light tinkering, but most were the same.
Soon, however, I reached a sentence that stuck out. The words, and I will
never forget them, said, "A pressing need for haste is not essential." And I
thought, "I didn't write that line." I read it again. "A pressing need for haste
is not essential." The sentence was very simple and it went right to the heart
of the issue that these other judges were raising. I realized that the
importance of the issue may have eluded me, but it hadn't eluded Judge
Canby. In those eight little words, Judge Canby made it clear that he had
thought carefully about that issue, and he had simply and elegantly
addressed it. I might not have fully appreciated the ramifications of each
side's argument in the case, but he certainly had. Those eight glorious
words gave me an enormous sense of relief. They proved that it was not me
who had decided this case. I was a mere scribe. Judge Canby had seen the
important issue and addressed it in "vintage Canby" manner: pithy, concise,
and clear. More importantly, I had not put Judge Canby at cross-purposes
with his colleagues-he had done it to himself! That day, I was relieved but
humbled. I gained a keen appreciation for the bottomless well of wisdom
that Judge Canby has. I also learned a bit about how lonely judging must be.
Hopefully someday there will be a "Canby Scholar in Residence" who is
worthy of the name. You are not getting such a scholar today, but I am
deeply honored to be here and I will address an issue that I think Judge
Canby will appreciate. Though my introduction to criminal procedure with
Judge Canby was hardly auspicious, I have become more acquainted with
the subject over the years and I have spent much of the last five years
examining more closely issues of criminal law and procedure on Indian
reservations. It is to this subject that I will now turn. I will begin with some
introductory remarks about the problem. I will then offer some anecdotes
and observations of the practical problems in this area and attempt to
ground those pragmatic concerns in criminal law and procedure theory.
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Finally, I will suggest some directions for solving the practical and
theoretical problems that exist in Indian country criminal justice.
Crime and criminal justice are among the most pressing problems in
Indian country today. Amnesty International has accused the United States
of human rights violations for failing to provide minimal protections for
American Indian women in the United States.3 The Wall Street Journal has
recently discussed the problem of criminal justice and public safety in
Indian reservations.4 Other mainstream media outlets have also begun to
cover the issue, including an award-winning series in the Denver Post.5 The
media coverage has drawn significant Congressional attention to the issue.
In a recent Senate hearing, I told the Indian Affairs Committee that the
problem is that the so-called "thin blue line" that protects the ordinary
citizen from crime is actually more like "a dotted line" in Indian country.6
When I became a professor in 2002, these subjects had not been
addressed in any depth in several years. Professor Robert Clinton wrote the
seminal articles in the field in 1974 and 1975.' In the first of those articles,
he promised three articles.8 He said that the first article would lay out the
historical development of the Indian country criminal justice scheme; the
second article would critique its current form; and the third article would
provide solutions.9 Professor Clinton's first two articles were masterpieces,
but he never wrote the third article. For a young scholar interested in this
area, this created an opportunity. So I used Professor Clinton's pathbreaking work as the foundation for my own work, drawing insight from
my own professional experience, and I started to work.
3.
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INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
IN THE USA 10 (2007), available at

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/035/2007/en/dom-AMR510352007en.pdf.
4.
Gary Fields, On US Indian Reservations, Criminals Slip Through Gaps, WALL ST. J.,
June 12, 2007, at A.
5.
In November 2007, investigative reporter Mike Riley authored a four-part series in the
Denver Post entitled "Lawless Lands" which discussed in-depth the problem of criminal justice
in Indian country. The series won the American Bar Association's prestigious 2008 Silver
Gavel Award for newspaper reporting on pressing legal issues.
6.
Oversight Hearing on Law Enforcement in Indian Country before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (Testimony of Byron Dorgan, Chairman); see also
Jerry Reynolds, Law Enforcement is a "DottedBlue Line" in Indian Country, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, June 29, 2007, at Al.
7.
See generally Robert N. Clinton, CriminalJurisdictionOver Indian Lands: A Journey
Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976) [hereinafter Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction];Robert N. Clinton, Development of CriminalJurisdictionover Indian Lands: The
HistoricalPerspective, 17 ARiz. L. REv. 951 (1975) [hereinafter Clinton, Development].
8.
See Clinton, Development, supra note 7, at 952 n.9.
9.
Id.

40:1003]

AMERICAN INDIANS CRIME AND THE LA W

1009

My interest in the field was sparked when I was serving as a federal
prosecutor in Indian country. It was very important work, and I loved the
job. I probably could have enjoyed it for an entire career, but I received an
untimely promotion that ended my service as an Assistant United States
Attorney. My experience as a prosecutor in this area was key, however, for
my work helped me think about the problems with Indian country criminal
justice. To provide context for the problem, I will begin by discussing a
series of anecdotes, observations and data points from my life and my
practice. Then, I will try to use these anecdotes to explain the broader
theoretical problems for which they serve as symptoms. Finally, I will
suggest a path toward solutions to the many problems of criminal justice in
Indian country.
My first observation will allow me to tell another story about Judge
Canby. One of my co-clerks, Michael Edson, once told me a funny story
about his interview with Judge Canby. Michael was ten or fifteen years
older than me, pursuing law as a second career. He was first or second in his
class at the University of Michigan Law School, and he was bright and selfassured. During his interview with Judge Canby, he began to feel that the
questions Judge Canby had asked him were not substantive. At the end of
the interview, Judge Canby stood up and they shook hands. Michael paused
and said, "You know, Judge, I'm just a little disappointed. All we did here
was chit-chat for half an hour. You didn't ask me anything substantive. You
didn't ask me any hard questions."
Apparently without missing a beat, Judge Canby looked at Michael and
said, "Who was Millard Fillmore's vice-president?"
Michael shrugged and, dejected, said, "I don't know."
Such is the good humor of Judge Canby that I doubt that he even had to
follow up with the obvious retort, "Are you now satisfied?"
Well, just to show that Judge Canby has been a rotten influence as often
as he's been a good influence, I have a similar question: has anyone ever
heard of Grover Cleveland? Grover Cleveland served two terms as
president and the terms were non-consecutive."° This makes him the answer
to an American political trivia question. Despite this trivia, President
Cleveland has had far greater significance in my life. My great-grandfather
was prosecuted for murder, convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to
death in Indian Territory in the 1890s. He was sentenced to hang by the
notorious "hanging judge," federal Judge Isaac Parker of the District of
10. Michael Gerhardt, The Constitutional Significance of Forgotten Presidents, 54 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 467, 497 (2006).
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Arkansas, who presided over offenses from the Indian Territory next door."'
If my great-grandfather had swung from the gallows, he never would have
had children with my great-grandmother. And I would never have been
born.
But shortly before the execution was set to occur, Grover Cleveland
pardoned my great-grandfather. If you don't like anything I have to say
today, you can blame Grover Cleveland. While President Cleveland's
pardon of my grandfather is just an interesting piece of trivia from my
family history, it illustrates a larger problem with criminal justice in Indian
country.
Think about what this story means. While most American citizens, who
are routinely prosecuted in state courts, can obtain a pardon from the
governor of the state in which the prosecution takes place, many American
Indians on Indian reservations are subject to federal jurisdiction. A
convicted Indian defendant must obtain a pardon, if at all, from the leader of
the free world. One need not be particularly insightful to see the problem. It
is simple mathematics. The President of the United States has a much larger
responsibility than the average governor. And he has more than 300 million
people under his jurisdiction.
If you are inclined to be concerned about disparity in the criminal justice
system, this would seem to provide evidence of troubling disparity. Even if
you think criminal sentencing is not too harsh as long as there are viable
opportunities for the exercise of mercy opportunities, there may be no
viable opportunity in these cases. This story cries out for greater scrutiny of
pardon and clemency decisions in Indian country cases.
Now, let me offer an observation from my practice. In one of my first
cases as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I had a routine detention hearing in an
Indian country case. In a detention hearing, the judge determines whether to
release the suspect or order him detained until trial. And the question is
whether the person is a flight risk or a danger to the community. I cannot
remember how the case came out, but after the hearing, my supervisor, the
First Assistant United States Attorney, came over and put his arm around
me and offered me some advice. He said, "In the next detention hearing you
11. Judge Isaac Parker was portrayed in the movie "True Grit" and was apparently of great
interest to Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist: Prizing People, Place,and History, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1695, 1700 (2006) (suggesting
that this connection had a link to then-Justice Rehnquist's 1978 decision in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Tribe). See also Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts'
Frustration of Tribal +---* Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 14 (2003) (discussing
Judge Parker's views of the Cherokee courts).

40:1003]

AMERICAN INDIANS CRIME AND THE LA W

1011

have, I don't want you to say 'the defendant is a danger to the community.'
Instead, I want you to say 'the defendant is a danger to our community,'
because it makes the judge and all of us feel like we're in the same boat
together."
I instantly saw that this was an excellent litigation trick, but it didn't
really ring true to me. Most of the defendants I prosecuted in Indian country
cases lived hundreds of miles from the courthouse. They were not part of a
community that included me or the public defender or the judge. Indeed,
Indian country wasn't the same community at all. It was an entirely
different community. Often, the defendants even spoke a different language.
Moreover, the federal government would not even have jurisdiction over
these same offenses if they occurred in the judge's community, or the
prosecutor's or defender's. The whole basis for federal jurisdiction in Indian
country was, in effect, to prevent state law enforcement authorities from
encroaching on reservations and thus to maintain the ability of these
communities to remain separate and distinct.
During my service as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, I tried five or six cases
that arose in Indian country, and I don't believe that a Native American was
ever seated as a juror in one of my cases. Often, the venire from which the
jury was selected had only a handful of American Indians. These few would
routinely be excused for cause or struck, and would never end up serving. In
other words, the Indian country community was absent from the cases
arising in Indian country.
It was also very rare for an American Indian to serve on a grand jury. In
the jurisdictions where I have worked, a federal grand jury tends to be
seated for twelve or eighteen months and will meet for up to one week each
month. As a federal prosecutor, I spent a lot of time in front of the grand
jury, and we tended to appreciate their work. At the end of their term, we
would have a small reception to thank them for serving as a grand juror. I
remember talking to one of those grand jurors one day at such a reception,
and I asked her what she learned while serving as a grand juror. This grand
juror was a small Hispanic woman, older, probably in her 60s, who had
lived her entire life in the south valley of Albuquerque, an impoverished,
high-crime area. Her response: "I learned that Indian reservations are awful.
I would never want to live there."
I was struck by her comment. This juror had lived all her life in a very
tough barrio and she thought that Indian reservations were bad. Her
impression was honest. For the past year, she had met regularly each month
with other jurors to see the worst that was happening in Indian country.
She'd seen scores of child sex assault cases, rapes and homicides. My guess
was that she didn't fully understand the subtle jurisdiction pattern that was
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at work to mold her evidence (only federal cases go to the federal grand
jury). But I was certain about her conviction. And I was left with the feeling
that she had developed a misimpression of Indian country, because she had
only seen the worst. I fear that she went to family and church gatherings in
her own community thereafter and reported her impressions of Indian
country. Since the crimes that she had seen tend to track pretty closely with
poverty, her own neighborhood likely had a similar crime rate. Yet, from
her grand jury service, she had gained a particularly jaded impression of
Indian country.
Another observation, this one about trial: one day I was sitting in the
back of the courtroom in a very important Indian country double homicide
case. There were only about three other people sitting in the gallery in the
back of the courtroom: a Navajo woman and her two sons. And the boys
were, roughly, ten to twelve years old. I was there to observe a colleague
present a very important case. There was, by the way, no press in the room.
It was a double homicide case, and there was no media attention. If this
offense had occurred in Albuquerque or Phoenix, the press would have been
there in force. In most cities, a double homicide is a subject of some
attention. But this was an Indian country case, so no one was there to cover
the case. But I digress.
There was a witness on the stand and there was an interpreter because
the witness spoke only Navajo. When the interpreter would translate the
witness's answer, the little boys would sometimes snicker. This happened
three or four times in the course of a few minutes. During the next recess, I
asked the boys why they were laughing sometimes. And they replied that
they were laughing at the interpreter because she wasn't translating very
accurately. These boys had grown up bilingual, and they believed that the
witness was routinely being misinterpreted.
I had a sinking feeling as I realized that the interpreter may not be
reliable. In a double murder case, the likely federal sentence is life
imprisonment without parole. The magnitude of the injustice that "justice"
can cause when the process is unreliable is striking. It makes one wonder
whether a criminal justice system can ever be reliable when it routinely
functions in a language that is foreign to the people and the land it is meant
to serve. In sum, English is not the language in which many Navajo
offenses occur. Many of these offenses transpire among Navajos with
Navajo speakers, the native language of the Navajo Reservation. In
translating these events into English, significant facts may be lost in
translation, especially when the interpreting is unreliable.
Most of the violent cases in Indian country-upwards of ninety
percent-involve abuse of alcohol or drugs. A common defense strategy in
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those cases has two somewhat interrelated themes. First, who could
possibly know what happened when every witness was intoxicated? How
can anything be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in such circumstances?
You usually can prove existence of a death, but beyond that, things become
cloudy. The prosecution may be arguing premeditated and deliberate
murder, but the defendant may be arguing perfect self-defense. And such a
case may turn largely on the behavior of the deceased. The second theme
that often arises is related to the first, but is a little more subtle: "This is a
case involving drunken Indians on an Indian reservation far away from
here. Why is it a federal case?" It always struck me that neither defense
would work very well on the reservation if the case had been tried before
Indian people, and thus they seemed, to some degree, like distractions from
the issues in the case.
Within the United States Attorney's Office, Indian country cases often
were not prioritized. While I was serving as an assistant U.S. attorney,
several vehicles were vandalized at a Bureau of Indian Affairs school called
the Torreon Day School.12 The school principal kept calling my supervisor,
the chief of the Violent Crimes Section, and imploring him to prosecute the
suspects. It was a simple case with, as I recall, four adults and three
juveniles, all teenagers. They had broken into several vehicles, by breaking
out a side window, and tried to get each one started by jamming a
screwdriver into the ignition switch. They finally succeeded in getting a van
started and made it about a mile before hitting a curb hard and flattening
three of the tires. In all, the suspects had caused about $20,000 in damage.
This case was not the kind of case that federal prosecutors enjoy
prosecuting. It would make most federal prosecutors yawn. And to make
matters worse, since it involved both juveniles and adults, it was a little
more complicated than the average case, requiring a split prosecution. As
the most junior prosecutor, I was assigned the case. After a couple of
conversations with the school principal, I thought, "You know, he's right;
this case should be prosecuted. There ought to be some ramifications to this
kind of vandalism or no one will learn." But I worried that my supervisors
would not let me prosecute the case because there were much higher
priorities. To bring a prosecution in that office, one had to draft a
prosecution memo. In the subject line, I labeled the case "The Torreon Day
School Massacre" and I made my best argument, and the management,
probably somewhat reluctantly, approved the prosecution. In any other
prosecutor's office, such a case would have been routinely prosecuted and
12.

These events are drawn from personal recollections of the author.
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there would be mechanisms for handling it through appropriate diversionary
channels, but at a BIA school in Indian country, "making a federal case out
of it" was the only way to ensure its prosecution.
To me, each of the preceding observations is a symptom of a basic
problem criminal justice in Indian country. When I began to apply a
theoretical lens to these problems, I realized that the core of each of these
problems is the same. And the problem is better described from the realm of
criminal procedure than through Indian law. The basic point is this: criminal
justice in Indian country operates in a manner that is fundamentally
inconsistent with our most basic values as to how criminal justice is
supposed to work in the United States. Two of the values that I will discuss
further are closely related: one of them relates to the community and the
other relates to localism.
The first value, not discussed often, but implicit in much of the structure
of our criminal justice system, is localism-the notion that criminal justice
should be handled locally, especially for local crimes. Numerous scholars
have engaged in handwringing about the increasing federalization of
crime, 3 and in some circumstances, local crimes have been federalized, 4
but federal prosecutions remain exceptional. Only in the narcotics area are
there significant numbers of cases prosecuted federally and those can be
justified by the fact that narcotics distribution schemes are often
international in scope. Even in the narcotics area, the vast majority of
prosecutions occur at the state or local level.
In Indian country, however, local crimes are federalized. Serious
offenses, such as aggravated assaults, sex offenses, homicides, and cases
involving juveniles, are prosecuted federally. These cases are almost
entirely local offenses with local harms. Many of them are disputes within
very small communities. Often, the suspect and the victim know one
another and, indeed, a very high number of them arise within a single home
or family. Absent the Indian country location of these offenses, almost all of
them would be prosecuted locally.
The other fundamental value worth discussing is related to the notion of
community. Criminal justice in the United States is fundamentally designed
to be a community endeavor. The United States Constitution has numerous
13. See, e.g., Susan A. Ehrlich, The IncreasingFederalizationof Crime, 32 ARjZ. ST. L.J.
825 (2000); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
CriminalLaw, 89 CORNELL L. REV 1, 35-36 (2003); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al
Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the PoliticalEconomy of PretextualProsecution, 105 COLUM.
L. REv. 583, 610 (2005).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006) (making carjacking a federal crime).
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constitutional provisions that demand that the community be involved in
criminal justice. Consider the following examples. First, criminal trials are
required to be not just "speedy," but also "public."' 5 One justification for
this rule is that the community is entitled to know that its offenses are being
prosecuted. 6 It is essential to law and order that communities know that the
crimes within their communities are being addressed. 7 The publicity is also
essential to the restorative process of justice. Since a crime is often viewed
as a tear in the fabric of society, and it is through the criminal justice
process that we mend that tear, criminal trials need to be public.' 8
Another purpose served by publicity is protection of the right of the
defendant.19 In theory, the watchful eyes of the public help prevent judicial
persecution of individuals.2" However, the public must be interested in the
trial and serving its watchdog role. The defendant's own community is
likely to be best situated, and perhaps best motivated, to protect him from
abusive prosecutions. Indeed, people from other communities are less likely
to empathize with the defendant.
Publicity is also essential to some of the most important goals of criminal
law and punishment, the deterrence of crimes. Utilitarian theorists assert
that offenders are less likely to offend if they fear swift and certain
prosecution. People need to see that there are ramifications for their
offenses. Through public trials and convictions, public punishment
telegraphs to offenders the message: "this could happen to you."'" There are
also more subtle factors at work, including the general socializing and
stigmatizing effects that criminal processes can have to change social
norms.

15.

22

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

16. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (protecting
the public right of access to criminal trials).
17. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (suggesting
that when a community "begin[s] to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy--of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law").
18. This is a simple Rawlsian conception of the purposes of the criminal justice system.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
19. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979).
20. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948).
21. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American CriminalLaw, 89 MICH.L. REV.
1880, 1904-07 (1991).
22. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83
VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).
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The problem with many of the Indian country cases is that these values
served by publicity are fundamentally absent.23 These cases happen a
hundred or more miles away from the communities where the offenses
occurred. And these cases often get little or no publicity on the reservation.
By and large, the press is absent. And many people in the community have
no idea what is happening in these cases. The community may know that
someone was arrested and taken away, but they often do not know what
happened thereafter. And that's a problem, because the community may not
feel that its crime was addressed, or does not know if it was addressed.
Criminal justice is not a process in which the community is engaged. To
explain it in more familiar terms, it is not a process that happens "of the
people, for the people, or by the people." It happens "to the people" through
an external process run by outsiders.
The protective purposes of criminal process for defendants are absent as
well. The notion is that a defendant's community will be vigilant against
oppressive actions by corrupt government officials. But in Indian country
cases, this avenue for accountability is absent. The community just never
sees the trial. They never know what's happening in these cases. The cases
happen hundreds of miles away from where the crime occurred.
None of the valuable interests of publicity are served if the community
doesn't know what's happening. If a tree falls in the forest, and nobody is
there to hear it, does it make any sound? This logical conundrum should not
arise in the context of a criminal trial. The trial serves a public function and
it cannot serve that purpose fully without publicity.
While the trial is designed to be observable by interested members of the
public, it is also designed very explicitly to involve members of the public.
Through the members of the jury, who serve as proxies, the larger
community is intimately involved in criminal justice in the United States.
Indeed, the jury's very purpose is to represent the community. According to
the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to be at least
minimally representative of the community.24 While the Court allows some
variance to creep in during the jury selection process to address a different
problem related to bias and prejudice, the venire must be drawn from a fair
cross section of the community.25

23. Some of these thoughts are explored in greater detail in Kevin K. Washburn, American
Indians, Crime and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REv. 709, 764-72 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1979).
25. The principle is codified in the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69
(2006).
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A jury ensures that criminal justice is only partially conirolled by
government officials. It is the community itself, acting through the jury,
who makes the most important decisions. Use of the citizens of the
community in this key role is what gives the criminal justice system in the
United States its very legitimacy. Putting the final decision in the hands of
citizens ensures that no one is railroaded by government officials.26 The
notion that a person is entitled to a trial by a "jury of his peers" is
fundamental, even27 though those words never actually appear in the
constitutional text.

How well can the criminal justice system work, however, if the
community in which the crimes arose is not represented on the jury?
Routinely, in Indian country cases, the jury deciding the case lacks even a
single member who is from Indian country. Venue is a large part of the
problem. Imagine taking all the criminal cases in Maricopa County in
Phoenix and trying them down in Tucson in Pima County. Imagine taking
all of the serious crimes in Los Angeles and trying them in San Francisco.
Those scenarios are absurd, right? But we do it routinely in Indian country
cases. Many cases from the Navajo reservation are tried in Phoenix, and
sometimes that's 350 miles away from where the crime occurred. Given the
distance from Phoenix to the Navajo Reservation, any offense that occurs
on the Navajo Reservation will be tried at least 200 miles from where the
crime occurred. If it seems absurd in the previous example, why isn't it
absurd in the circumstances of Indian country?
The point here is that, in the United States, we have a very elaborate,
very stylized system of criminal justice. A key premise is that you must
involve human beings in the process. And not just any human beings will
do. With apologies to Thomas Friedman, in criminal justice, the world is
not flat. 2' Though our elaborate American criminal justice regime is laborintensive, we would no sooner outsource the criminal trials in Los Angeles
to India, to Tijuana, or even to a different American city.
Now, because of local prejudices, of course sometimes a trial must be
moved to a different venue where a fair and unbiased jury will be available.
But change of venue is the exception that proves the rule. Under the
American system, a change of venue is always exceptional and never
26. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
27. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as explicitly including "of his
peers." See id. at 156.
28. See generally THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005) (discussing globalization, the outsourcing of American jobs to
foreign countries).
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It happens only rarely and only when justified by other important

values related to fairness to the defendant. And, by the way, changes in
venue can have significant negative consequences. When the Rodney King
defendants were tried outside of Los Angeles, for example, angry
communities in Los Angeles rioted and caused more than $1 billion worth
of property damage in Los Angeles. 3' These negative ramifications
presumably arose precisely because the affected community doubted the
legitimacy of processes that did not involve it.
Citing Alexis de Tocqueville, some have suggested that the use of
citizens on juries also helps to educate citizens and the community about
how criminal justice works.3 If this is true, then people from Indian country

aren't being educated very effectively as to how criminal justice works in
their communities. And if one of the purposes is to educate, why would we
leave out the newest members of the American citizenry?32 Thus, while
political legitimacy is one of the casualties of the system that we have,

educational outcomes are another.
The absence of citizens of Indian country on juries hearing Indian

country offenses also undermines utilitarian theories justifying criminal law
and punishment. The force of a jury's verdict in expressing moral
condemnation is directly related to the jury's composition. The fact that the

jury's verdict of guilty reflects an expression of moral condemnation by
one's peers is crucial to the reformative effect that the process is designed to

have on the defendant. Having members of the defendant's own community
say "we find you guilty" is likely to be far more weighty, powerful, and
sobering than having strangers from a different community make such a
pronouncement. Indeed, these problems may be exacerbated when race is
involved, as it is so explicitly involved in Indian country cases.33 The
defendant who faces a jury full of strangers, who look different than he,
29. Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with
PrejudicialPretrialPublicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 665, 667 (1991) ("Courts
rarely employ such an extraordinary and expensive measure as a change of venue.").
30. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 88 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional
Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2027, 2055 (2008) ("[T]he jury, which is the
most energetic form of popular rule, is also the most effective means of teaching people how to
rule." (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 316-18 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Library of America 2004) (1862)).
32. American Indians were not routinely admitted to American citizenship by birth until
1924 with enactment of the Indian Citizenship Act. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233,
43 Stat. 253.
33. See generally Bethany R. Berger, "Power over this Unfortunate Race ": Race, Politics
and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1957 (2004).
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may cling to claims of unfairness and racism. He may not be forced to
confront his own guilt directly.
Thus, though some may wonder why the crime rate is high in Indian
country, we can hypothesize reasons from simple criminal law theory. First,
offenders do not feel the weight of condemnation of their community and
may be more likely to re-offend. Second, potential offenders are not
deterred because they are not aware of the prosecutions and outcomes of
cases against other offenders. Indeed, on Indian reservations, criminal
justice is a mysterious, distant process with little local involvement. Thus,
high Indian country crime rates may be inexplicable to those who do not
understand criminal law theory and how criminal justice works, but any
first-year law student who has taken criminal law ought to be able to see
that simple concepts like general deterrence and rehabilitation are simply
not working as they are meant to work in the Indian country context.
I mentioned earlier that a common defense in criminal trials is to suggest
to the federal jury, at least implicitly, that Indian country cases involving
intoxicated Indians should not be in federal court. When I was trying these
cases, I sometimes became angry when this kind of defense was raised. I
thought that there was something vaguely racist about it. But because these
cases are routine offenses with primarily local effects, I now think that the
defense attorneys who raise such defenses may actually have the right
instincts. Defense attorneys may be correct in wondering why federal juries
should be interested in these cases. It is now clear to me that it is wrong for
Indian offenses to be tried before juries that are uninterested and
unconnected to the communities where the offenses occurred. It is contrary
to some of the most fundamental values of criminal justice in the United
States.
Now, return to the anecdote that I used to begin the discussion. I have
already suggested that the clemency procedures of the American system are
unfair in light of the fact that they rely on uncertain action by the highest
executive official in the United States, but this is merely the most extreme
example. The entire federal law enforcement system is problematic. I do not
question the integrity of federal law enforcement officials generally. These
public servants are doing important work with the highest motives. They are
trying to protect Indian communities, a very honorable goal. The problem is
that they simply cannot be very good at it. A federal official is
institutionally incompetent in this context, for several reasons.
First, there is the basic problem of democratic accountability. Most
prosecutors in the United States are elected by the community they serve.
U.S. Attorneys are an exception. U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the
President. Because of the tremendous crime problem in Indian country,
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there is arguably a much greater need for democratic accountability. Yet the
officials involved there are the least accountable officials in the United
States. If an Indian community does not like the way its offenses are being
prosecuted, what action can it take? It can vote for a different president in
the next quadrennial election and hope that the new president will have a
policy more in line with the community's desires.
This democratic accountability issue is not only a practical problem; it
also poses a theoretical problem. One of the reasons prosecutors are given
wide discretion in the American model of criminal justice is related to the
delegation of power from the legislature to the executive branch. The
legislature enacts the laws and then delegates to the prosecutor the
enforcement of those laws. The legislature enacts far more laws than could
possibly be fully prosecuted. And far more crime occurs than prosecutors
could ever prosecute. Legislatures are justified in granting the decisions as
to which laws to enforce and which crimes to prosecute on the theory that
the prosecutors are best at keeping their fingers on the pulse of the
community and determining which crimes ought to be prosecuted.
In most American jurisdictions, that process works fine. Since, in most
jurisdictions prosecutors are members of the community that they are
serving, they are able to exercise such discretion. But U.S. Attorneys
routinely are not members of the Indian country communities for which
they prosecute.34 I doubt that there is a U.S. Attorney or Assistant United
States Attorney in the country who lives within Indian country. Arizona
U.S. Attorney Diane Humetewa is a member of the Hopi Tribe.35 For these
purposes, she has greater legitimacy than perhaps any other U.S. Attorney
in the entire United States. But keep in mind that she does not live on the
Hopi Reservation and she was not appointed by the Hopi Tribe or the
Navajo Nation or any of the Indian tribes in Arizona. She was appointed by
George W. Bush and her oath binds her to the enforcement of the laws of
the United States, not to the will of Indian communities.
The second major problem with the role of federal authorities in this area
is the troubling dynamic that is created. My label for this dynamic-I have
called it "the cavalry effect"36 has drawn a lot of negative attention from
my former colleagues in U.S. Attorneys' Offices nationwide, but the
dynamic itself is not really subject to question; it is well known to

34. See Washburn, supra note 23, at 729-30.
35. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Diane Humetewa Sworn in as U.S. Attorney
(Dec. 18, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 25686341.
36. Washburn, supra note 23, at 735.

40:1003]

AMERICAN INDIANS CRIME AND THE LA W

1021

practicing federal prosecutors and they must deal with it regularly in Indian
country cases.
Although the cavalry effect can happen in many different kinds of cases,
the most tragic example is in prosecutions for sexual abuse of a child. What
often happens in child sex abuse cases in Indian country when a child
comes forward and reports the abuse, is it begins a federal investigative
process. When federal law enforcement officials arrive, a predictable,
though unfortunate, reaction by the community in many cases is to oppose
the federal authorities. The community circles the wagons, so to speak,
around the defendant, and turns against the outsiders, the federal
prosecutors, who are threatening to disrupt the community. We can blame
the community for this dysfunctional reaction to an allegation of child sex
abuse, but we cannot deny these communities their cultural histories and
those histories are bound to have some effect. Indian communities have
been resisting federal authorities, off and on, for more than a hundred years.
We should not be surprised when they do so in this context.
What should be apparent is that when Indian communities turn against
victims, however, they do so precisely because of the dynamic created by
making criminal justice in Indian country a federal responsibility. That
dynamic is not inevitable in criminal cases; it exists precisely because of the
federal identity of the law enforcement agency and prosecutors on the case.
The dynamic poses significant problems for victims. A victim might well
be less likely to report an offense if the response is likely to be from federal
officials outside the tribe. Because of this dynamic, a victim might
rationally decide not to report a crime. Unlike the federal officials who will
leave the reservation after the investigation, the victim may well need to
live there the rest of her life.
A third problem with using federal officials is that the institutional
advantages of federal law enforcement are absent in Indian country. In
theory, federal officials are justified in exercising a limited role in American
criminal justice because they are handling interjurisdictional crimes, such as
the narcotics offenses discussed previously.37 Federal officials have a
seamless web of national authority that allows them to work throughout the
United States without the need to negotiate for cooperation with local
officials. This unique advantage of federal law enforcement agents is absent
in Indian country where federal authority hinges on the race of the victims

37. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995).
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and suspects.3"
Moreover, federal law enforcement officials are not
necessarily well-suited to prosecuting violent crimes in Indian country.
Many-and perhaps most-FBI recruits signed up and went to the FBI
Academy in Quantico, Virginia, because they wanted to work on
sophisticated types of offenses, and other exotic work such as counterespionage and counter-terrorism. My experience is that few agents signed
up because they wanted to be posted to rural offices and assigned to
investigate child sex offenses.
In addition to the vast cultural gulf that exists between federal law
enforcement agents and prosecutors and the communities they are tasked
with serving is the potentially even more dramatic, and yet very pragmatic,
problem of the significant geographic gulf. Because of the hundreds of
miles that lie between federal courts and the communities where the crimes
occurred, it is sometimes a matter of pure luck as to whether the prosecutor,
or the defense attorney, will be able to marshal their witnesses at the
appropriate place and time for a trial. And just as some reservation residents
sometimes find it difficult navigating a hundred miles or more to the federal
courthouses in downtown Albuquerque, Denver or Phoenix, or even Reno,
Helena, or Grand Forks, the federal officials are equally uncomfortable
investigating offenses on Indian reservations.
Even the best law enforcement agents work better in communities that
they know and in which they can gain significant local cooperation.39 This
practical insight forms much of the basis for the community policing
approaches that are among the leading prevention and investigative
strategies in law enforcement in the last couple of decades. 40 FBI agents are
not uniformed and they are not designed to engage in community policing.
The most effective agents do get to know the Indian communities in which
they work, but they are outsiders and, thus, they begin with an additional
obstacle that local law enforcement officials do not ordinarily face. If
community policing models work well enough to be among the dominant
policing strategies in the United States, why must Indian country

38. It is generally recognized that the United States lacks authority over crimes by nonindians against non-Indians in Indian country. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1881).
39. Partly this is because of the greater perception of the legitimacy of law enforcement in
community policing. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and
Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1524-25 (2002) ("Citizens are more disposed to
cooperate with police when.. . . citizens perceive that they are receiving fair and respectful
treatment by police and other decision makers.").
40. Id. (seeking to provide a theory to explain the success).
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communities continue to rely primarily on outsiders for the investigation of

serious crimes?
Despite the increasing value of localism in criminal justice generally,
and in policing specifically, the federal Indian country regime has been
slow to adopt it. In myriad ways, the federal criminal justice regime ignores
local institutions of criminal justice. The entire thrust of the federal Indian
country regime is to impose federal norms on tribal communities. 4' In the
Major Crimes Act,42 Congress has chosen which serious offenses it wishes
to impose on tribal communities. And even though tribal self-determination
itself has become an important norm in federal policy, Congress continues
to expand the Major Crimes Act and, thus, the reach of federal authority in
Indian country. 43 At the same time, the federal regime often ignores the
views of important tribal institutions. For example, although the federal
sentencing guidelines place significant weight on an offender's state and
federal criminal convictions in the important criminal history axis of the
sentencing grid, the guidelines discourage federal courts from routinely
considering an offender's tribal criminal convictions.44 Such an approach
not only undermines the rationale for accounting for an offender's past
criminal record, it also does unnecessary violence to the (largely theoretical)
partnership that exists between tribal and federal governing institutions on
Indian reservations.
In sum, the institutions of criminal justice in Indian country are deeply
flawed and are failing to function in a manner consistent with American
criminal justice values or modern policing theory. While my criticism has a
lot of different points, it has a consistent theme. Indeed, the important
American values that are missing in the Indian country criminal justice
system might be characterized as norms of self-determination. In the
Constitution, the founders sought to vest ordinary communities with selfdetermination. Although American criminal justice is designed to work in a
manner that intimately involves the affected community in criminal justice,
41. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L.
REv. 777, 784-85 (2006).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§ 215, 120 Stat. 587, 617 (2006) (adding "felony child abuse or neglect" to the enumeration of
offenses that federal prosecutors can pursue in federal courts).
44. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403,
415-417 (2004). Another irony in the federal courts' failure to count tribal convictions is the
fact that state courts more and more are showing respect for tribal criminal convictions, though
in sometimes troubling ways. See Kevin K. Washburn, A Different Kind of Symmetry, 34 N.M.
L. Rev. 263, 271-78 (2004).
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the federal criminal justice system in Indian country has tended to leave out
the Indian community.
While it is often easier to criticize than to chart a path toward more
constructive institutions, the problem identified here is not unique to
criminal justice. If we look to other areas of American Indian policy, we can
find guideposts to help us. Tribal governments have long suffered from
what might be called a self-determination deficit. In virtually every other
area of federal Indian policy in recent years, Congress has sought to
increase tribal self-determination and tribal self-governance. It has
happened in health care: tribes can now contract to provide the same
services that the Indian Health Service once exclusively provided.45 It has
happened in schools and education: many tribes now run their own
schools.4 6 It has even happened in real estate, land and resources
management, 4 and environmental programs.48 In each of these areas tribes
are taking primary roles in handling these important governmental
functions. And in each of these areas, services have reportedly improved.49
Ironically, though, Congress has not engaged in any significant measure
in improving tribal self-determination in the area of criminal justice. I call
this "ironic" because one can hardly imagine a more important area of law,
policy, and government service than criminal law and procedure. Criminal
law is the formal institution in which a community articulates and codifies
its most sacrosanct values.5" Some wrongful actions, of course, violate basic
standards of behavior and our duties to our fellow citizens. In the American
system, these are called "torts." No one is ever imprisoned for merely
committing a tort. Indeed, only if a misdeed is so wrongful that it offends
45. Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to
American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 134 (2004) ("Tribes and tribal groups, through
contracts and compacts with the IHS operate 13 hospitals, 172 health centers, 3 school health
centers, and 260 health stations (including 176 Alaska Native village clinics).").
46. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450(aHn) (2000)).
47. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REv. 225, 231
(1996) ("[M]any Indian nations have contracted with the federal government to conduct forestry
programs on their reservations, often leading to improved management of their timber
resources.").
48. See Douglas Luckerman, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Environmental Primacy on
Tribal Lands, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 635, 639-40 (2003) (suggesting ways in which tribes can
"maintain environmental regulatory primacy").
49. James Hamilton & Tadd Johnson, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From
Paternalismto Empowerment, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 1251 passim (1995).
50. For elaboration of this argument see Kevin K. Washburn, Federal CriminalLaw and
Tribal Self-Determination,84 N.C. L. REv. 779, 834-36 (2006).
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our deepest moral values do we label it a "crime" and threaten to punish it
with incarceration or worse. Criminal laws are, thus, imbued with much
greater moral authority than other laws.
For this reason, I would argue that criminal law and procedure is more
fundamental than the delivery of other governmental services such as
healthcare or education, or even environmental protection. To have true
self-determination, a community must be able to define its own moral code
through its criminal laws and articulate a process for enforcing them. And if
a community does not have that power, then it does not have meaningful
self-determination. In sum, although tribal self-determination has been a
political slogan for a long time, and it has made some modest in-roads in
federal policy, it does not truly exist in one of the most important and highstakes activities of government. Tribal self-determination, despite a very
promising start and a lot of support, is in its infancy.
With this in mind, I think that there are at least two different approaches
available to improve criminal justice in Indian country. One approach
would simply be to modify the existing federal criminal justice system so
that it is more consistent with its own values.
There are many minor reforms that would go a long way toward
restoring the legitimacy of this deeply flawed system. Let me offer just a
few examples. First, the President could assign a pardon attorney solely to
evaluate cases from Indian country to ensure that these purely local offenses
are treated a little more evenly. Second, each federal district with substantial
Indian country jurisdiction could assemble an "Indian country grand jury"
constructed strictly for purposes of hearing the cases arising from Indian
country.51 Third, the federal courts could begin to draw jury venires for
federal Indian country cases strictly from the citizens who live within Indian
country.52 Fourth, federal judges should regularly hold court in Indian
country so that an Indian country community has greater access to its own
criminal trials.53 Better yet, perhaps a "circuit-riding" federal judge should
be appointed who only hears cases in Indian country. Fifth, as has been
done in the past, tribal prosecutors could be appointed to serve as special
assistant U.S. attorneys to prosecute cases arising in Indian country.
51.

For a broader application of this argument, see generally Kevin K. Washburn,

Restoring the GrandJury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333 (2008).

52. For an argument that the Sixth Amendment requires this approach, see generally
Washburn, supra note 23, at 761-62.
53. Chief Judge Martha Vasquez of the Federal District Court of New Mexico held a
criminal trial at Shiprock on the Navajo Reservation in December of 2005. Bruce Daniels,
Historic Trial Begins,
ALBUQUERQUE
J.,
Dec.
14,
2005,
available at
http://www.abqjoumal.com/abqnews/content/view/294/2/.
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The problem with most of these approaches, however, is that they are at
war with a basic fact on the ground, namely geography. Indian reservations
tend to lie a long way from federal courthouses. As long as federal judges,
prosecutors and defenders are housed primarily in the immediate vicinity of
federal courthouses, it would require Herculean efforts to transport the
mechanisms of federal criminal justice to the Indian country communities
that this system is designed to serve.
The better approach is suggested in the discussion above on tribal selfdetermination. Federal policy should seek to restore tribal capacities for
handling some or all of these functions. A tribal self-determination
approach would credit the work that is happening in other areas of federal
Indian policy. In short, rather than trying to transport a cumbersome federal
justice system to distant Indian reservations, Congress and tribal
governments should work to grow criminal justice systems on Indian
reservations. Professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres once said that the
solution to the problem facing the "miner's canary" is not to affix an
oxygen mask to the canary, but to rid the mine of the poison gas.54
Law enforcement and criminal justice in Indian country ought to be
primarily a tribal endeavor rather than a federal one, just as these functions
in any American city or county would be handled by members of local
governments there. Some tribes are ready, willing, and able to take greater
responsibilities for criminal justice on their reservations. Over the long
term, tribal criminal justice systems must be nurtured and developed, at
least for the tribes that are large enough and/or wealthy enough to sustain
them. Greater tribal involvement in criminal justice would be more
legitimate and more effective. Where tribes wish for greater involvement, it
should be facilitated.
Meanwhile, in the near term, we must re-align existing federal functions
with federal constitutional values. The evidence set forth above suggests
that the federal justice system has abandoned its own governing principles
to work in Indian country. If a federal institution is not living up to the
values set forth in the U.S. Constitution, it is fair to conclude that it has lost
its way. In light of some of the arguments raised above, I would argue that
many Indian country convictions have serious constitutional defects. These
defects are structural and cannot be remedied without significant reform.
Thankfully, federal policy-makers are beginning to focus on several of
these problems. Senators Dorgan, Johnson, Tester and Thune have released
54. Lani Guineir & Gerald Torres, Excerpt from the Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race,
Resisting Power, TransformingDemocracy, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 2 (2001).
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a draft of proposed legislation, tentatively entitled the "Tribal Justice
Improvement Act of 2008."" 5 The draft bill, which is intended to begin the
consultation process with tribes, focuses on specific improvements in Indian
country criminal justice and law enforcement in several ways.
First, the proposed bill would require better recordkeeping and reporting
of crime rates, investigation and prosecution declinations, and tribal
records. Having researched in Indian country for several years, one of the
most difficult obstacles to improving the system is being able to pinpoint
where the problems are worst. The data simply is not available. ThenMayor Rudy Giuliani claimed that the dramatic improvement in the crime
rate in New York City during the 1990s was due largely to his "CompStat"
system in which police were able to monitor street-level crime on a daily
basis, identify crime hotspots quickly and shift resources into those areas or
near them.56 Sadly, data on crimes in Indian country are often not even
available annually because the data simply is not collected that way. Better
information collected at the federal level will help interested observers to
determine for themselves whether the problem is as severe as claimed by
researchers like me, interest groups like Amnesty International, and media
sources like the Wall Street Journal.
Second, the bill would improve communication and federal
accountability by requiring federal officers to report declinations in
investigations or prosecutions directly to tribal officers and to an office in
Washington that would monitor Indian country crime. Under the proposal,
tribal officials will be better informed of federal actions.
Third, the bill would create several institutional mechanisms designed to
improve criminal justice in Indian country. It would establish the
aforementioned Office of Indian Country Crime in the Department of
Justice. While establishment of an office may sound like window-dressing,
it can be an effective way to improve federal oversight of federal criminal
justice efforts, and for bringing a greater high-level institutional focus to a
problem. The bill would also establish a blue-ribbon panel called the Indian
Law and Order Commission to investigate and produce a comprehensive
study of Indian country criminal justice and to recommend modifications.
55. A copy of the draft bill was circulated to the public on June 12, 2008. Letter from the
12,
2008),
available at
on
Indian
Affairs
(June
Senate
Committee
http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/__files/Draftbillandcoverletter061208.pdf.
56. Oversight Hearing on Law Enforcement in Indian Country Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 55-57 (2007) (Testimony of Kevin K. Washburn, Associate
available
at
of
Minnesota
Law
School),
Professor,
University
http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/I10s/36303.pdf.
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Fourth, the bill would begin the process of restoring tribal capacities for
criminal justice. One of the proposals, likely to be controversial, involves a
partial lifting of the one-year limit on tribal sentences imposed on tribes in
the Indian Civil Rights Act.57 The proposal will allow tribal governments to
authorize their courts to impose criminal sentences of up to three years.
Moreover, the Bureau of Prisons would be required to provide services to
house tribally-sentenced criminal defendants, relieving the problem of lack
of resources which has been the principal obstacle to effective use of
incarceration by tribes. While perhaps tribes ought not be encouraged to
rely more extensively on incarceration, this no-cost prison option may free
tribes up to be more experimental in trying lesser sanctions with assurance
that prison can be imposed freely if lesser sanctions are unsuccessful.
Fifth, the bill would promote state accountability in Public Law 280
states (states in which Congress has delegated power to states to exercise
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country) by providing concurrent federal
jurisdiction in mandatory Public Law 280 states where a tribe opts for
resumption of federal involvement. In sum, where a state fails to meet its
responsibilities to address crime in Indian country,58 the federal government
will be able to step in and prosecute.
Finally, the bill would authorize a host of new appropriations programs
to improve tribal law enforcement programs, to encourage cooperation
between tribal law enforcement and neighboring state and local agencies,
and generally to increase the status of tribal police in the national
community of law enforcement, such as by giving them access to national
criminal information databases. Of course, the authorization of such
programs is useful only if appropriations follow. Indian country has been
disappointed often in the past when programs were authorized and yet not
fully financed.59 Still, the authorization of such programs is an excellent
start.
57. For a discussion of the ICRA limitations on tribal sentences, and the pernicious effects
of those limitations, see Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 822-28 & n.245 (2006).
58. For discussions on the failures of states and the federal government to meet their law
and order responsibilities in Indian country, see CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL
FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public
Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian County, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405,
1415-19 (1997) (discussing the effects of Public Law 280); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law
280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 541
(1975) (noting that federal law enforcement has also been "neither well-financed nor
vigorous").
59. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J.403,
408 n. 17 (2004) ("Congress has been rather long on policy pronouncements, and short on actual
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In some of the areas identified above, the proposal is fairly soft. It
encourages U.S. Attorneys to work with U.S. District Courts to hold trials
in Indian country, as appropriate. I would argue that this falls short of the
constitutional minimum necessary to provide full criminal procedural rights
to Indian defendants and to Indian communities, but it signals a recognition
of the problem.
In conclusion, the last five years have shown that sustained scholarly
attention to a serious problem can help to focus others on the problem and
force the search for solutions. It is obvious that the problems in Indian
country are somewhat easier to identify than they are to fix. No solution is
perfect. No solution is inexpensive.
We can be sure, though, that Indian communities must be integral to any
solution. Since crime is a community problem, it can never be fully
addressed by outsiders. Nor should it be. If outsiders were capable of
reducing the crime rate in a community to zero, one would have significant
questions about the freedoms available to that community. We must place
Indian communities in the center of any solutions we develop, just as the
Constitution envisions, and just as the successful tribal self-determination
policies prescribe.

appropriations.
...
); see generally S. Bobo Dean & Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support
Funding and the FederalPolicy ofIndian TribalSelf-Determination, 36 TULSA L.J. 349 (2000).

